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ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: WHY THE
THIRD CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME
IN PETRUSKA V. GANNON UNIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION
Alleged Title VII violations by employers are heavily litigated in
the United States. While many such claims are valid, numerous claims
are unfounded. Many of the large employers regularly facing Title
VII lawsuits are familiar to us, including Wal-Mart, General Motors,
and McDonald's.' However, there is one type of employer that does
not immediately come to mind: religious organizations, including
churches, religiously affiliated schools and universities, and charitable
organizations. It is difficult to envision these types of employers en-
gaging in invidious sexual or racial discrimination; however, it does
occur. While it may be surprising to some that religious organizations
engage in such offensive discrimination, what is even more surprising
is that U.S. courts regularly allow them to do so. The judicially cre-
ated "ministerial exception" to Title VII permits courts to summarily
dismiss plaintiffs' claims once it has been established that the em-
ployer is a religious organization. The ministerial exception is overly
broad, contradicts congressional intent, and is "at odds with American
culture and legal tradition."'2
For many people, the word "minister" encompasses pastors, priests,
and nuns-those persons that play central roles in the livelihood of
churches or other religious organizations. Pursuant to the ministerial
exception, however, several circuit courts have adopted a broader
meaning, finding that choir directors,3 organists, 4 and communications
managers 5 also qualify as "ministers." Once an employee has been
labeled a "minister" by the court, she is precluded from alleging that
racial or sexual discrimination occurred in her place of employment.
1. See, e.g., Moranski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2005); Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Alberter v. McDonald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138
(D. Nev. 1999).
2. EDWARD R. BECKER, Foreword, in MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION
AND THE RULE OF LAW xi (2005).
3. Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1184 (E.D. Wis.
2001).
4. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
5. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003).
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As a result, churches and other religious organizations are free to en-
gage in discrimination that is prohibited by Title VII for all other
places of employment. While there have been U.S. Supreme Court
cases discussing various aspects of the exception, the Court has yet to
directly address the constitutionality of the ministerial exception.
6
In a ground-breaking decision, the Third Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to look beyond the plaintiff's position and
focus on whether the employment decision was a result of impermissi-
ble discrimination under Title VII.7 Unfortunately, this progressive
decision was later vacated by the court when it joined other circuits in
adopting the broader version of the ministerial exception.8 Despite
this, the first Petruska v. Gannon University decision will be the sub-
ject of this Note. The Third Circuit's reasoning in its original decision
should be adopted by courts, because it would end the problematic
discrimination that religious organizations have been practicing with-
out intruding on their First Amendment rights.9
6. The only Court decision in this area, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), "turned on the constitutionality
of a limited statutory exemption from Title VII" and, therefore, "there is no authoritative gui-
dance on the most problematic issue of all: whether the First Amendment exempts religious
institutions from the application of employment discrimination laws." Joanne C. Brant, "Our
Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 276 (1994). Moreover, it does not appear that the Court will directly
address the ministerial exception anytime soon. It denied certiorari on April 23, 2007. Petruska
v. Gannon Univ., No. 06-985, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4357 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2007).
7. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska I), No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135 (3d Cir.
May 24, 2006), vacated, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir. June 20, 2006). Although Petruska
I was originally published at 448 F.3d 615, the opinion was withdrawn from the Federal Reporter
when the court vacated its earlier opinion on June 20, 2006. Before its May 2006 decision, the
Third Circuit, along with the Fifth Circuit, typically gave the ministerial exemption "a broader
reading, holding that religious based employment practices should be given some deference,
even when they violate Title VII on a nonreligious basis." Treaver Hodson, The Religious Em-
ployer Exemption Under Title VII: Should a Church Define Its Own Activities?, 1994 BYU L.
REV. 571, 572 (citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944. 951 (3d Cir. 1991)).
8. Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088, at *2. The Honorable Edward R. Becker, the
Third Circuit judge who authored the majority opinion, died on May 19, 2006. After his death,
Gannon University's request for a rehearing by a new panel of judges was granted. This new
panel vacated the original decision and subsequently authored an opinion joining the majority of
circuit courts. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska 11), 462 F.3d 294. 299 (3d Cir. 2006).
9. A critical aspect of Petruska I was the court's ability to anticipate and successfully resolve
the First Amendment issues that have surfaced in virtually every case involving the ministerial
exception. Before authoring Petruska I, Judge Becker discussed several of the affirmative de-
fenses utilized by religious institutions when faced with a Title VII claim: "In recent years. relig-
ious entities ... have advocated a presumptive constitutional right to avoid the law pursuant to
the federal and state free exercise of religion guarantees, arguing that the First Amendment, the
Due Process Clause, and the separation of powers render them immune from some legal re-
quirements and precepts." BECKER, supra note 2. at xi.
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This Note continues in four parts. First, Part II discusses the Title
VII statute and cases illustrating the inception and application of the
ministerial exception. 10 Part III examines the subject case, Petruska v.
Gannon University, in greater detail, with particular emphasis on the
facts of the case. 1 Next, Part IV analyzes a major underlying theme
of the Petruska decision and essentially all ministerial exception cases:
the inherent conflict between the First Amendment and the Four-
teenth Amendment. 12 Finally, Part V considers why women, out of all
of the named protected classes, are the most affected by this exception
to Title VII. 13
II. BACKGROUND
Before turning to the current application of the judicially created
ministerial exception, it is necessary to understand how and why the
exception was formed. Section A discusses the legislative history of
Title VII and the section 702 religious exemption that Congress ex-
pressly included in the statute at its inception. 14 Next, Sections B and
C focus on the ministerial exception, the reasons for its formation, and
how the definition of "minister" has expanded over the years.15 Fi-
nally, because one of the main arguments in favor of a broad applica-
tion of the ministerial exception is that it prevents courts from
violating the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,1 6 Part D pro-
vides a brief overview of how the Free Exercise Clause and the Estab-
lishment Clause relate to the ministerial exception.17
A. History of the Ministerial Exception
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to eliminate discrimina-
tion against individuals due to their race, color, religion, sex, or na-
10. See infra notes 14-103 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 104-187 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 188-222 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 223-237 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 34-76 and accompanying text.
16. See Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title
VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2007 (2007) ("[T]he Free
Exercise Clause mandates a broad ministerial exception to Title VII.").
17. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text. The Establishment Clause is discussed in
greater detail than the Free Exercise Clause, partly because many scholars believe that Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), rejects the Free
Exercise Clause as a justification for the ministerial exemption. See Caroline Mala Corbin,
Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2004 (2007).
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tional origin. 8 As enacted in 1964, section 702 of Title VII provided
that its prohibitions should not apply "to a religious corporation, asso-
ciation, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities."' 19
Notably, Congress declined to "exempt religious employers entirely,
[and] created instead a tailored exemption which exempts from opera-
tion of the statute only those hiring decisions made by religious em-
ployers on the basis of religion. '20  Thus, the original religious
exemption's application was limited to discrimination regarding relig-
ious activities.2 1
However, in 1972, the exemption was broadened to include nonreli-
gious activities as well. 22 As amended, section 702 now exempts relig-
ious organizations from Title VII "with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with
the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institu-
tion, or society of its activities. '23 Congress expanded the exemption
to spare courts from deciding what constituted a "religious activity. '24
18. Title VII of the Act addresses discrimination in the workplace:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). When Congress enacted Title VII, it "decreed that the policy of outlaw-
ing discrimination in the workplace should be one of 'highest priority"' and "intended to pro-
hibit any form of discrimination in the workplace that would create inequality in employment
opportunity." Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Note, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Ac-
cess to Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. L.J. 269, 270-71 (1998) (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976)).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
20. Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (E.D. Wis.
2001) (emphasis added).
21. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987). For cases illustrating the exemption as
originally enacted, see Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960 (D.C. Utah 1980), and Fike v. United
Methodist Children's Home of Virginia, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Va. 1982).
22. Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provisions of § 702 of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 67 A.L.R. FED. 874 § 4 (West 2006).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
24. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2005) (stating that "[t]o spare religious entities the burden of legal
uncertainty, government inquiry, and possible litigation, Congress expanded the exemption in
1972 to cover hiring for all activities, rather than just 'religious activities,' of religious
organizations").
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Yet it is important to recognize that, for the second time, Congress
explicitly refused to construct the section 702 exemption in a manner
that allows religious employers to consider race, sex, or national origin
when making employment decisions.
The amended version of section 702 raised doubts among courts re-
garding the constitutionality of the religious exemption. 25 Some
courts viewed this as granting preferential treatment to religious em-
ployers in violation of the Establishment Clause. 26 Eventually, the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the section 702 amendment
exempting secular nonprofit activities of religious institutions was con-
stitutional in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 27 The plaintiffs in Amos, individ-
uals employed by the church in nonreligious capacities, were dis-
charged for failing to attain church membership. 28 The plaintiffs
argued that "allow[ing] religious employers to discriminate on relig-
ious grounds in hiring for nonreligious jobs" violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment. 29
The Court disagreed.30 Rather than viewing section 702 as bestow-
ing a benefit on religious organizations, the Court found that Congress
was acting "with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that bur-
dens the exercise of religion," and, as a result, there was "no reason to
require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular
entities."'3 ' In short, the Court made a distinction between the gov-
ernment's act of advancing religion in an unconstitutional manner and
simply allowing religious employers "to define and carry out their re-
25. See Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the
Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions,
54 VAND. L. REV. 481, 487-88 (2001) ("Because Congress did not limit the scope of the amend-
ment's application, exempted 'activities' could arguably extend to any for-profit endeavors pur-
sued by a religious institution .... Congress also opened the door to constitutional challenges
based on the amendment's seemingly preferential treatment of religious institutions conducting
non-religious activities.").
26. See, e.g., Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980). For further
commentary on the view that states grant religion "privilege against legitimate governmental
concerns," see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248-49
(1994).
27. 483 U.S. 327, 331 (1987).
28. Id. at 330. For instance, Mr. Mayson, the plaintiff whose claims were the subject of the
appeal, was employed as a building engineer at the church's gymnasium. The scope of Mayson's
employment did not include spreading or teaching religious doctrine or practices in any way.
29. Id. at 331.
30. Id. at 338.
31. Id.
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ligious missions."3 In upholding the amended version of section 702,
the Court made it clear that religious employers were free to discrimi-
nate against any employee on the basis of her religion, without taking
into account the scope, activities, or nature of her employment in the
organization. 33
B. The Ministerial Exception and Other Forms of Discrimination
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the same is
true for other forms of discrimination that are prohibited by Title VII,
namely, whether religious employers can discriminate on the basis of
race, color, sex, or national origin. 34 To date, the Court has left this
issue for the federal courts of appeals to resolve. For example, in Mc-
Clure v. Salvation Army, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the no-
tion that Congress intended for religious organizations to be exempt
from all forms of discrimination. 35 The court found that the language
and legislative history of section 702 supported this finding.36 How-
ever, placing the emphasis back on the relationship between the plain-
tiff and her religious employer, the court turned its analysis to the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.37 In so doing, the McClure
court became the first to recognize the "ministerial exception" to Title
VII employment discrimination claims.
Billie McClure, the plaintiff in this watershed case, was an ordained
minister in the Salvation Army.38 During her employment at the Sal-
vation Army, McClure was paid less and received fewer benefits than
similarly situated male officers. 39 As a result, she commenced a civil
action, claiming that the Salvation Army's discriminatory practices vi-
olated Title VII.40 While the Fifth Circuit recognized that it is imper-
missible for a church to discriminate on the basis of sex, it fashioned
32. Id. at 339; accord Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 24, at 36 ("[T]he Court concluded that the
legislative exemption fell in a zone of permission between what the Free Exercise Clause might
require, and what the Establishment Clause would forbid.").
33. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 330 (finding that applying the section 702 exemption to the secular
nonprofit activities of religious organizations does not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment).
34. Daniel J. Rosenthal, Charitable Choice Programs and Title VIi's Co-Religionist Exemp-
tion, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 641, 645 n.20 (2006).
35. 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. ("The language and the legislative history of § 702 compel the conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend that a religious organization be exempted from liability for discriminating
against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin with respect to their
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 554.
39. Id. at 555.
40. Id.
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an exception allowing it to do so by other means.4' The court found
that, when a Title VII lawsuit involves an employee that is considered
a "minister" of the church, courts should take a "hands-off" ap-
proach.42 In other words, the Fifth Circuit held that applying the pro-
visions of Title VII to "the employment relationship existing between
... a church and its minister would result in an encroachment by the
State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter
by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment."'43 It concluded that, in drafting Title VII, Congress did not in-
tend for courts to regulate employment disputes regarding a church
and its minister. 44
Like the Fifth Circuit, other courts have chosen to interpret Title
VII's religious exemption broadly, mainly because they do not want to
infringe on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.45 For ex-
ample, in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
the Fourth Circuit found that free exercise of religion easily overrides
"the state's interest in assuring equal employment opportunities for
all."' 46 The court stated that a religious institution's right to select the
person who will lead its congregation is so fundamental that it should
be completely free from government interference. 47 It emphasized
that such employment decisions are crucial to "the well-being of relig-
ious community, for perpetuation of a church's existence may depend
upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, and
interpret its doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at
large."'48 In addition to the infringement on free exercise, the court
found that the risk of entanglement in this principal function of relig-
ion is too great.49 Thus, the central holding of Rayburn focused on the
functions that the employee served: "if the employee's primary duties
consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervi-
sion of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious
41. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61.
42. Id. at 560.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 560-61.
45. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that it was permissible for a
Catholic school to refuse to rehire the plaintiff teacher, because she remarried outside of the
church).
46. 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985).
47. Id. The nature of the Fourth Circuit's finding conflicts with its earlier statement in the
opinion that "[t]he language and the legislative history of Title VI both indicate that the statute
exempts religious institutions only to a narrow extent." Id. at 1166 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1167-68 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 1170.
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ritual and worship, he or she should be considered 'clergy." 50 Thus,
Rayburn provided a context in which to apply the ministerial excep-
tion created by the Fifth Circuit.
However, looking at the Rayburn test from a practical viewpoint, it
does not succeed in narrowing the application of the ministerial ex-
ception to those cases that truly warrant it.51 Rather, in Rayburn, the
Fourth Circuit made it clear that, when determining whether a partic-
ular employee is a "minister," the court may not inquire into the
church's motive behind the employment action.52 For instance, the
Seventh Circuit has interpreted Rayburn's treatment of the ministerial
exception as "preclud[ing] any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons be-
hind a church's ministerial employment decision. The church need
not, for example, proffer any religious justification for its decision, for
the Free Exercise Clause 'protects the act of a decision rather than a
motivation behind it.' "3
C. The Expanding Definition of "Minister"
After the Fifth Circuit founded the ministerial exception in Mc-
Clure and the Fourth Circuit clarified the definition of "minister" in
Rayburn, other district and appellate courts utilized this test to dismiss
numerous Title VII claims as soon as they discovered that the plaintiff
served the religious organization in any capacity. For example, in
Starkman v. Evans, the Fifth Circuit used the principles articulated in
McClure and Rayburn to formulate its own three-prong test for deter-
mining whether a plaintiff is a "minister" for the purposes of the min-
isterial exception.5 4 Upon concluding that the choir director did, in
50. Id. at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord. A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)).
51. Another student commentator pointed out that, alternatively, the ambiguous nature of
Rayburn's definition of minister has caused some courts to "occasionally misunderst[and] the
spiritual import of some employment positions." See Dunlap, supra note 16, at 2012. Dunlap
also cited EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277. 283 (5th Cir. Unit
A July 1981), as one case where the court arguably "failed to recognize the spiritual function of
the administrative staff at the seminary." Dunlap, supra note 16, at 2012 n.41; accord JULIA K.
STRONKS, LAW, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A COMMENTARY ON FIRST AMENDMENT JURIS-
PRUDENCE 71 (2002) (arguing that Rayburn's use of the ministerial exception creates confusion
and inconsistency among judges because "it allows [them] to decide for themselves what defini-
tion of 'religion' they want to use").
52. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
53. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000)).
54. 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999). The three factors are as follows: (1) whether the em-
ployment decision was based largely on religious criteria; (2) whether the employee was quali-
fied and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the church; and (3) whether the employee
1100 [Vol. 57:1093
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fact, qualify as a minister, it promptly affirmed the district court's de-
cision to grant summary judgment to the religious employer.55
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the widespread view that
minimal judicial analysis is required for Title VII claims brought by
employees of religious institutions.5 6 In Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, Gloria Alicea-Hernandez, a Hispanic woman, was
employed as the Hispanic Communications Manager for the Archdio-
cese of Chicago.57 During her nine-month tenure, Alicea-Hernandez
filed several complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), alleging that she was continuously humiliated
and excluded in the workplace and was eventually replaced "by a
male Hispanic with less competence and experience in Hispanic com-
munication. '5 8 However, the district and appellate courts refused to
address the discriminatory treatment she experienced and, instead, fo-
cused solely on her position.59 The court rejected Alicea-Hernandez's
suggestion that it consider "the nature of her claims and whether the
discrimination in question was exclusively secular. '60 Rather, relying
on Rayburn's broad deference to religious organizations, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that any individual who serves as a "liaison" be-
tween the church and the community is precluded from bringing a
Title VII claim. 61 Because the court refused to consider the church's
doctrine, it effectively characterized the plaintiff as a "minister," even
though it is equally possible that the church's religious beliefs would
not define her as such. 62 Her role as the press secretary to the His-
panic community was enough for the court to arrive at that
conclusion.63
As the Starkman and Alicea-Hernandez decisions demonstrate, the
ministerial exception precludes courts from considering the merits of
plaintiffs' claims.64 Moreover, nothing prevents a church or other re-
engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious, including whether the
plaintiff attends to the religious needs of the faithful. Id.
55. Id. at 177.
56. Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703. According to the court, the sole issue on appeal was
"whether Alicea-Hernandez's position as Hispanic Communications Manager can functionally
be classified as ministerial." Id.
57. Id. at 700.
58. Id. at 702.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 703.
61. ld. at 704.
62. Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703.
63. Id. at 703-04.
64. Id. at 702, 704 (affirming that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, by its very
nature, bars the court from reaching the merits of the case).
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ligious institution from asserting the ministerial exception as a pretext
for impermissible discrimination. Miller v. Bay View United Methodist
Church, Inc., a recent case in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, illus-
trates this troubling fact. 65 The plaintiff in Miller was an African
American woman who, after an extensive interviewing process, was
hired as the church's Choir and Music Director.66 Among other du-
ties, she was responsible for "preparing the music for the Sunday wor-
ship service, practicing with the choirs in the weeks before the worship
services, and leading the choirs and congregation in song during the
Sunday worship services. '67 During her interview, the church asked
her about her religious denomination. 68 She responded that she was a
member of a different Methodist church and a "self-proclaimed 'relig-
ious' and 'spiritual' person. ' 69 The selection committee found the
plaintiff to be well qualified for the position and hired her.70 Six
months later, she was fired.71
Although the plaintiff in Miller was qualified for the position and fit
the church's religious criteria,72 the actual reasons behind her termina-
tion remain unknown. The limited facts of the case reveal that the
plaintiff successfully fulfilled her job duties. 73 Other than that, the dis-
trict court's opinion is completely devoid of any information regarding
the circumstances surrounding her termination. Instead, the court
concentrated on applying the Starkman three-factor test to evaluate
the plaintiff's role as a "minister. ' 74 After finding the first two factors
to be satisfied, the court quickly determined that, because she was
"engaged in traditionally ecclesiastical or religious activities," the min-
isterial exception applied. 75 This case is another example of how a
court's emphasis on the plaintiff's role within the church allows it to
make snap decisions based on what it accepts as traditionally ecclesi-
astical or religious activities. 76
65. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174. 1184 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
66. Id. at 1177.
67. Id. at 1178.
68. Id. at 1182.
69. Id. at 1177.
70. Id. at 1178.
71. Miller, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
72. Id. Title VII exempts religious organizations from religious discrimination claims. Thus, if
the church administrators opposed the plaintiff's religious denomination or practices, they likely
would not have hired her in the first place. However, they apparently found her religious de-
nomination to be acceptable, because they employed her for six months. Id.
73. Id. The facts are "limited," because the ministerial exception precludes the court from
inquiring about the reasons behind the plaintiff's termination.
74. Id. at 1181-83.
75. Id. at 1183.
76. Id.
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D. The Religion Clauses
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.177 Courts have used both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to
justify the ministerial exception to Title VII.78 As one court phrased
it, the ministerial exception "saves Title VII from unconstitutionality
under the First Amendment by requiring that Title VII suits be dis-
missed when they would impermissibly encroach upon the free exer-
cise rights of churches or excessively entangle government or
religion. 79
However, one U.S. Supreme Court case has cast doubts on lower
courts' use of the Free Exercise Clause to justify applying the ministe-
rial exception.8 0 In Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, the Court upheld Oregon's right to deny
unemployment compensation to two members pf the Native Ameri-
can Church after they were terminated from their jobs for ingesting
the hallucinogenic drug peyote. 81 While peyote is considered a "con-
trolled substance" under Oregon state law, it is also used for sacra-
mental purposes by the Native American Church. 82 In an opinion
written by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that "their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond
the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their
religious practice" and found that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability. '8 3 Notably, this decision also empha-
sized the importance of having legislatures, rather than courts, "decide
whether to create exceptions to a neutral, generally applicable law."'84
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
79. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).
80. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also Corbin,
supra note 17, at 1982. However, Smith has been widely criticized. See, e.g., John Delaney,
Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith,
25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 91 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1124 (1990); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1412 (1992) (referring to the decision
as a "regrettable departure from a doctrine that at least purported to value and protect religious
liberty").
81. 494 U.S. at 890.
82. id. at 874.
83. Id. at 878-79.
84. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 126
(2005).
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Courts have varied in their response to Smith. As one scholar
noted, most lower courts "have read the decision as a bright-line pro-
hibition on exemptions from facially neutral laws that 'only inciden-
tally' burden religion. ' 85 Still, other courts have interpreted Smith as
only eliminating the first of two types of protection offered by the
Free Exercise Clause. 86 According to these courts, "[t]he second type
of government infringement-interference with a church's ability to
select and manage its own clergy-was not at issue in Smith" and,
therefore, while "Smith limited free exercise protection of religious
individuals, [it] left intact the free exercise autonomy of religious insti-
tutions. ' 87 Thus, while commentators continue to debate which ap-
proach most appropriately interprets Smith,88  lower courts'
inconsistent decisions illustrate that one thing is clear: Smith has cre-
ated ambiguity in free exercise jurisprudence.8 9
Since Smith, many courts and commentators have drawn support
for the ministerial exception from the Establishment Clause. 90 In
Lemon v. Kurtzman, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a three-
prong test for determining whether a statute creates excessive entan-
glement in violation of the Establishment Clause.9' The first two fac-
tors require that the statute have a secular, legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.92 Third, the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.93 It is this third prong, and its prohibition on entanglement,
that is typically at issue in Title VII cases involving ministerial employ-
ees.94 For instance, in Miller, the court addressed the two ways gov-
85. Brant, supra note 6, at 301. Brant also correctly observed that, "[s]ince the employment
discrimination laws are not directed at religious institutions, Smith requires a reconsideration of
the continuing validity of [the ministerial exemption]." Id. at 277.
86. Corbin, supra note 17, at 1983-84 (citing Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of
Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656-57 (10th Cir. 2002)).
87. Id. For a general critique of this position, see generally id. at 1981-2002 (discussing at
length three key weaknesses of courts' attempts to distinguish Smith from ministerial exception
cases).
88. See, e.g., John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the Colorable Showing
Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division v. Smith, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV.
741 (2005).
89. See Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable
Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2000) (stating that, "[in the
wake of Smith, confusion abounds in the lower courts, which interpret the Court's new test in
significantly divergent ways").
90. Corbin, supra note 17, at 2004.
91. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
92. Id. at 612.
93. Id. at 613.
94. Corbin, supra note 17, at 2005.
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ernment entanglement can occur: procedurally and substantively. 95
First, the Miller court concluded that applying Title VII on its face
would "allow[ ] the commencement of a potentially protracted legal
process" and result in excessive procedural entanglement. 96 Specifi-
cally, the court found that, if it were to apply Title VII, the defen-
dant's "personnel and records would inevitably become subject to
subpoena, discovery, cross examination, [and] the full panoply of legal
process designed to probe the mind of the church in the selection of its
ministers." 97  Second, the court determined that inquiring into
whether the church's religious justification was merely pretexual
would lead to excessive substantive entanglement. 98 According to the
court, reviewing the plaintiff's job performance unquestionably of-
fends the First Amendment."
Clearly, the ministerial exception ensures that courts will not violate
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, sparing them the diffi-
cult task of conducting a more substantive investigation into what ac-
tually happened regarding the plaintiff's employment. Yet, as scholars
have pointed out, many of these inquiries would not be sufficiently
difficult or intrusive as to unlawfully entangle the government with
religious matters. 100 In the case of a choir director, for example, there
are often documented statements and criteria that a church specifi-
cally looks to when hiring such an individual.10' In these cases, it
95. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1183 (E.D. Wis. 2001) ("Procedural entanglement arises in situations
where a protracted legal process pits church and state as adversaries, while substantive entangle-
ment arises where the Government is placed in a position of choosing among competing relig-
ious visions." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
96. Id. at 1184. In the end, the Miller court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. However, the court's language indicates that this premature
dismissal was based largely on the court's assumptions regarding the course that this legal action
could potentially take. As Corbin pointed out, "no one has closely examined actual Title VII
litigation to determine how likely" it is that courts would be forced to evaluate issues concerning
religious doctrine. Corbin, supra note 17, at 2006.
97. Miller, 141 F. Supp. 2d. at 1183 (alteration in original) (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Confer-
ence of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (1985)). The court was again making as-
sumptions regarding the future of the lawsuit, which, at this early stage, was simply unknown.
98. Id. at 1184.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 84.
101. For example, the plaintiff in Miller was subjected to a vigorous interviewing process by a
special selection committee, during which she was given a printed copy of the choir director's job
description. 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78 ("[Pllaintiff's responsibilities . . . were described as
leading the Chancel Choir and the Contemporary Christian Choir."). After determining that
Miller met these requirements, the selection committee prepared a written recommendation that
she be hired. Id. Miller also interviewed with three additional people who reiterated her job
responsibilities and concluded that she was entirely qualified. Id. at 1178. It is noteworthy that
the Church specifically questioned Miller about her religious beliefs before hiring her. See id. at
1177.
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would not be overly intrusive for a court to conduct some investiga-
tion into the merits of a former employee's discrimination claim. 10 2
The following discussion of the Petruska decision demonstrates that
the inherent conflict between the First and Fourteenth Amendments
can be avoided, or at least minimized, to a point where courts can still
allow plaintiffs' discrimination claims to proceed. 10 3
III. SUBJECT OPINION: PETRUSKA V. GANNON UNIVERSITY
The Third Circuit's original Petruska decision was a step forward for
women and minorities throughout the United States. For the first
time, a circuit court delved into a more searching and meaningful
analysis of the ministerial exception. Judge Becker's well-reasoned
opinion recognizes many of the concerns feminists and legal scholars
had previously voiced regarding the ministerial exception. 0 4
First, this Part explains the essential facts surrounding Lynette Pe-
truska's ultimate resignation from her well-regarded position as chap-
lain at Gannon University.1 05 After laying out the facts in Section A,
Section B analyzes the Third Circuit's treatment of Petruska's consti-
tutional claims and the majority's decision to allow her Title VII case
to go forward.' 0 6 Section C discusses the dissent's perspective. 10 7 Sec-
tion D concludes with the holding of the original Petruska decision.10 8
A. The Facts Demonstrate that Petruska Experienced
Gender Discrimination
In July 1997, Gannon University hired Lynette Petruska to serve as
its Director of Social Concerns. 0 9 Two years later, when the position
102. Corbin discussed this notion in her article. See Corbin, supra note 17, at 2017. To illus-
trate, Corbin used the example of a divorced teacher at a religious school who helps a colleague
with a sexual harassment suit against the school and is subsequently fired. Should the school
claim that it terminated the teacher for violating its religious proscription against divorce, Corbin
pointed out that a court would still be able to determine "whether, assuming the school's religion
condemns divorce, this condemnation motivated the termination, or whether it was motivated by
illegal retaliation for protected conduct, or both." Id. at 2017 & n.350 (discussing alternative
arguments the teacher could make "without putting into issue the validity, truthfulness, or sub-
stance of Catholic religious teaching").
103. See infra notes 150-174 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Coon, supra note 25, at 487-88; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Con-
stitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1049, 1116 (1996).
105. See infra notes 109-149 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 150-174 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
109. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska I), No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *5
(3d Cir. May 24, 2006), reh'g granted, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir. June 20, 2006).
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of permanent chaplain of the university became available, the Presi-
dent of Gannon University, David Rubino, chose to appoint Pe-
truska." 0 However, as her complaint indicated, Petruska was initially
hesitant about accepting the promotion for several reasons. 1 ' First,
she was aware that Gannon University engaged in gender discrimina-
tion practices and followed discriminatory policies.1 12 Specifically, Pe-
truska was concerned about working under Bishop Donald Trautman,
who then served as the chair of Gannon's Board of Directors. 113 He
was known "for being unable to work with women and for removing
women from leadership positions" within the university. 114 Petruska
also worried that she would be replaced once a suitable male became
available to serve as chaplain.11 5 A former Gannon University chap-
lain, Reverend Nicholas Rouch, was due to return from Rome, and
Petruska felt that, if given the option, Gannon would prefer to retain a
man in this powerful position.116
On the other hand, accepting the chaplain position would have been
a step forward for Petruska's career. At Gannon, the role of chaplain
was equivalent to being vice president of a company.1 17 As chaplain,
Petruska would have served in a cabinet-level position on Rubino's
staff and would have had the opportunity to co-chair Gannon's Catho-
lic Identity Task Force.118 The chaplain was not solely a secular posi-
tion but was also responsible for a few religious duties.119 In
Petruska's case, she would have been responsible for holding prayer
services and planning liturgies.1 20 Moreover, at this time, Petruska
was very close to taking her final vows and becoming a nun in the
Catholic Church. 21 Accepting the chaplain position would have
made her the first female to serve in this position at Gannon Univer-
sity.122 Thus, before accepting the appointment, Petruska requested
and received assurance from Rubino that she would not be replaced
by Rouch when he returned from his study in Rome. 23 Rubino also
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *5.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *6.
120. Id.
121. Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2006, at Al.
122. Id.
123. Petruska I, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *5.
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assured her that she would not be replaced by any other male, so long
as her job performance was up to par. 12 4 In fact, "her tenure as chap-
lain would be based solely on her performance, and not her gen-
der." 25 This promise was upheld for several months before things
started to change at Gannon.' 26
In March 2000, Rubino "was accused of having a sexual affair with a
female subordinate" at the university. 27 As a result, he was forced to
take a leave of absence while Gannon investigated the matter. 128 It
was not difficult for the university to get to the bottom of the scandal,
because Rubino admitted the truth of the allegations to several uni-
versity officials. ,29 Soon after the first accusation, another female em-
ployee came forward and alleged that Rubino was guilty of sexually
harassing her as well.' 30 A few months later, Rubino resigned.' 3'
Provost Thomas Ostrowski was selected as Rubino's replacement and
immediately took over as acting president. 132
During this tumultuous time, Petruska took the responsibilities of
her position on the President's staff seriously. Petruska was heavily
involved in addressing the sexual improprieties taking place at Gan-
non. 33 In addition to serving on Gannon's Sexual Harassment Com-
mittee, Petruska aided Rubino's second harassment victim in coming
forward with her story.' 34 When Bishop Trautman "began a campaign
to conceal Rubino's misconduct," Petruska opposed him and, instead,
advocated openly dealing with the former president's embarrassing
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Petruska I, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *6.
130. Id. The university was ultimately forced to settle this claim. Id. at *22.
131. Id. at *6.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. While the sexual harassment was not directed toward Petruska or another clergy
member, commentators have noted that discrimination cases can be intertwined with cases in
which a clergy member alleges that she was harassed by another clergy member. See
Eikenberry, supra note 18, at 291-92. Eikenberry highlighted one case where the Minnesota
Court of Appeals separated a clergywoman's claims of discrimination and sexual harassment and
treated the latter differently under the Establishment Clause. See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d
715, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The court found that the Establishment Clause did not prevent
it from hearing the plaintiff's sexual harassment charge and "that excessive entanglement is a
question of degree, and the degree of intrusion necessary in resolving [her] sexual harassment
claims presented no greater conflict with the church's disciplinary authority than that presented
in cases enforcing child abuse laws." Eikenberry, supra note 18, at 291-92 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004)
(ordained female minister's "attempt to show that she was sexually harassed ... would, after all,
involve a purely secular inquiry").
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transgressions. 135 When several university lawyers encouraged Gan-
non to limit "the time period in which [sexual harassment] grievances
could be filed," Petruska lobbied against such limitations. 36 The re-
cord indicates that she was not alone in her approach, for her view on
the limitations issue "ultimately prevailed. 1 37 Overall, Petruska was
not afraid to shed light on some of the university's questionable dis-
crimination and harassment practices and policies, even though some
of the powerful men at the university opposed her.138
By July 2000, it was evident that Petruska had supporters and was
not the only person who disagreed with the way the university was
covering up the sexual harassment scandal. In response, Bishop
Trautman decided to take action. He instructed Ostrowski, Gannon's
acting president, to "place the Chaplain's Division under the control
of Rouch [who had returned from Rome], thereby making Petruska
Rouch's subordinate."1 39 Ostrowski refused to do so and informed
Petruska about Trautman's request. 40 "According to Petruska, Os-
trowski conceded that the proposed action was being taken solely on
the basis of Petruska's gender. Later, Ostrowski 'made it clear to [Pe-
truska] that Trautman and Rouch would never let her remain Chap-
lain at Gannon because of her gender."" 41 In January 2001,
Ostrowski learned that Trautman had fashioned an alternative plan. 142
Once Trautman was able to replace Ostrowski with a new President,
he planned to "'clean house' by removing three high-ranking univer-
sity officials, all of whom were female": Petruska, who was still serv-
ing as the permanent chaplain, the Executive Director of Admissions,
and the acting provost. 143
Little by little, Trautman's design began to unfold. A new male
president, Antoine Garibaldi, was appointed in May 2001.144 Gari-
baldi immediately eliminated a great deal of Petruska's decision-mak-
ing power by requiring "Rouch's approval of all important decisions
135. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *6.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *6-7. Petruska helped prepare a report that "criticized Gannon's discrimination
and harassment policies. Despite a request from Gannon's President, the committee that pre-
pared the report refused to modify portions criticizing the university." Id. Petruska also op-
posed allowing a former Gannon priest, who was required to leave after engaging in sexual
misconduct with students, from returning to campus. Id. at *7 n.4.
139. Id. at *7.
140. Id.
141. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *7 (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at *7-8.
143. Id. at *8.
144. Id.
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that Petruska, as chaplain, ordinarily made." 145 About a year passed
before Garibaldi made it clear that it would not be long before Rouch
would officially become Petruska's superior.146 In August 2002, Gari-
baldi informed Petruska "that he had decided to restructure the uni-
versity, that she would be removed from the President's Staff, and that
the Chaplain's Division would report to Rouch. The effect of the re-
structuring was to make Rouch Petruska's boss."' 147 Stripped of her
authority and on the verge of being fired, Petruska resigned in Octo-
ber 2002.148 Rouch made certain that the student body and staff did
not get any ideas about having another woman occupy Petruska's po-
sition by repeatedly telling them "that a woman would not be consid-
ered to replace Petruska as chaplain."'' 49
B. Applying the U.S. Constitution to Petruska
The Third Circuit, in an opinion by the late Judge Becker, began its
analysis of Petruska's claims by identifying "three explanations of why
the Constitution may require the ministerial exception.' 50 In the
past, other circuits had employed these three rationales to similar Title
VII cases. Thus, choosing to follow precedent created by other appel-
late courts, the court considered whether any of these rationales ap-
plied in Petruska's case.151 While the Third Circuit considered the
other circuits' analyses, it ultimately found that "neither Supreme
Court precedent nor the arguments advanced by [its] sister circuits
supports a ministerial exception that applies without regard to the rea-
son for an employment decision. 1 52 However, before analyzing the
ways the Third Circuit applied the three rationales in the Petruska de-
cision, it is important to define each rationale and understand how
they differ.
First, the "government scrutiny" rationale "holds that the ministe-
rial exception is necessary to avoid government probing or examina-
145. Id. The court noted that "Gannon has cited no explanation grounded in religious belief,
religious doctrine, or internal regulation for the decision to give to Rouch what had, in effect,
been Petruska's job." Id. at *23 n.19. The importance of Gannon's failure to provide a religious
reason will be discussed more extensively later in this Note. See infra notes 158-160, 171,
199-202.
146. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135. at *8.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *13.
151. Id.
152. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *14.
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tion of a church's affairs."' 53 This rationale stems from the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause, "which commands the govern-
ment to avoid entanglement in religious matters. 1 54 The pertinent
question under this mode of examination is as follows: Would al-
lowing Petruska to go forward with her Title VII claim result in "ex-
cessive judicial scrutiny" of Gannon University?1 55 In answering this
question, the court turned to a well-established U.S. Supreme Court
principle: "A secular court must not resolve issues of religious belief,
religious doctrine, or internal church regulation." 156 Supreme Court
precedent clearly places such matters "beyond judicial scrutiny.' 57
However, in this case, Gannon never asserted that it had a religious
reason for demoting Petruska. t58 Thus, a court could consider the ad-
verse employment action without delving into religious analysis. 159
Gannon's failure to offer a religious justification for Petruska's demo-
tion made it impossible to determine at that point in the lawsuit
whether its personnel and records would be subject to intrusive "sub-
poena, discovery, [or] cross-examination.' 160 Alternatively, if Gan-
non were to offer a religious justification for its employment decision,
the court found that this would not automatically mean that Pe-
truska's claim should be dismissed under the ministerial exception.161
There are several facts that lend themselves to a gender discrimination
claim. 162 Again, allowing a court to investigate these allegations to
determine if, in fact, impermissible discriminatory conduct took place
153. Id. Here, the court cited one of the main concerns voiced by the Fourth Circuit in Ray-
burn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985):
"Church personnel and records would inevitably become subject to subpoena, discovery, cross-
examination, the full panoply of legal process designed to probe the mind of the church in the
selection of its ministers."
154. Petruska I, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *14.
155. Id. at *39.
156. Id. The Court articulated and used this principle in past church autonomy and church
property lawsuits. See id. It has been argued that one of the most influential of these church
property cases, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), "sharply undermines any claim that the Free
Exercise Clause confers a wide-ranging right of autonomy upon religious organizations." Brant,
supra note 6, at 294.
157. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *39.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *14 n.10. For other cases where the defendant religious institution did not offer a
religious justification for its alleged discriminatory actions and the court still chose to apply the
ministerial exception, see Eikenberry, supra note 18, at 269-70 (arguing that "the Constitution
may not necessitate an exception to Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws in cases in which
the religious organization offers no religious justification for discriminatory employment
action").
161. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *39-40.
162. See supra notes 109-149.
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would not require it "to delve into religious questions," causing no
infringement on the Establishment Clause. 63
Second, "the 'selection of the clergy' rationale aims to prevent the
government from controlling actual employment decisions."' 64 After
considering other circuits' decisions employing this rationale, the
court found that this explanation seems to be grounded in the Free
Exercise Clause, rather than the Establishment Clause. 65  Some
courts have chosen to apply this rationale very broadly, finding that
the government should refrain from any involvement with religious
organizations' decisions regarding the hiring and firing of ministers. 166
While the Third Circuit generally agreed with this viewpoint, it placed
logical limitations on its position. 167 The court made an important dis-
tinction that set its position apart from its sister circuits. It stated,
"where an employment decision is devoid of religious or doctrinal
content, and is based solely on sexism, we fail to see how the decision
relates to the free exercise of religion." 168
Finally, the "inquiry into religious doctrine" rationale justifies a
court's use of the ministerial exception through the idea that the ex-
ception is "necessary to prevent [it] from resolving religious questions,
163. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *39-40. The court concluded this portion of
its analysis with another citation to its decision in Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary
Parish School, 7 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 1993). It reaffirmed that "[a] conclusion that the religious
reason did not in fact motivate dismissal would not implicate entanglement since that conclusion
implies nothing about the validity of the religious doctrine or practice." Petruska 1, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13135, at *394-40 (alterations in original).
164. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *15 (emphasis in original).
165. Id. Circuits have used both Religion Clauses to support this rationale. The Third Circuit
chose to focus on the Free Exercise Clause for its analysis, "because [the 'selection of clergy'
rationale] focuses on the right of a church to put its beliefs into practice through its choice of
ministers." Id.
166. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168
(4th Cir. 1985) ("Any attempt by government to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders ...
constitutes a burden on the church's free exercise rights." (emphasis added)).
167. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *47. For instance, "if a religious employer
fired a ministerial employee for reasons related to faith, doctrine, or internal regulation, a judg-
ment against the church would punish the church for expressing its beliefs." Id. In this situation,
the Third Circuit had no qualms about aligning itself with other courts, because involving itself in
such a manner would indeed infringe on the First Amendment.
168. Id. The court also provided an illustration to further its point:
Let us assume that a male applicant and a female applicant for a ministerial position
have identical religious views, that they are equally qualified, and that there is no relig-
ious reason to choose one over the other. Let us further assume that the decisionmaker
chooses the male candidate due to sexism that is utterly unconnected to his religious
beliefs. In such a case, we do not think that allowing the female candidate to bring suit
under Title VII would infringe on the religious autonomy of the church.
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which lie beyond judicial competence and authority."' 69 Some courts
have found that reviewing a ministerial employment decision would
require it to "determine the meaning of religious doctrine and canoni-
cal law."' 170 The court quickly disposed of this rationale, finding that,
as with the "government scrutiny" rationale, it was too early in the
case to decide whether "Petruska's claims will raise questions of a re-
ligious nature, requiring secular courts" to engage in an examination
of Gannon's religious doctrine. 171
In short, the Third Circuit was not persuaded that any one of these
three rationales justified dismissing Petruska's claim. While each of
the rationales presents reasons why the government should refrain
from becoming too involved in religious matters, and the ministerial
exception is one means of retaining separation of church and state, the
court found that there are ways to approach these rationales with
more "bite" and still remain true to the constitutionally mandated
separation. 72 Likewise, the court found that broadly applying the
three rationales would result in "compulsory deference"' 173 to religious
institutions, and it was unwilling to practice such deference, especially
because there was "nothing in the complaint suggest[ing] that Pe-
truska's demotion was based on religious belief, religious doctrine, or
internal church regulation.' '174
C. The Dissent's Perspective
In the original Petruska decision discussed above, Judge Smith en-
tered a strong dissent, finding that, in tailoring the ministerial excep-
169. Id. at *16.
170. Id. (quoting Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th
Cir. 1991)). The plaintiff in Scharon, an ordained Episcopal priest employed by the defendant
hospital as a chaplain in the Department of Pastoral Care, argued that "the defendants' claims
that religious issues were the basis of her termination [were] merely a pretext for the actual
motive behind her dismissal"-the actual motive, she alleged, was age and sex discrimination.
929 F.2d at 363. She urged the court to consider her claims and, like Petruska, alleged "govern-
ment involvement with religion can be avoided by focusing solely on the issues of age and sex
discrimination." Id. However, the court flat-out rejected this possibility, finding that a religious
inquiry was, in fact, unavoidable. "To allow Scharon's case to continue would necessarily lead to
the kind of inquiry into religious matters that the First Amendment forbids." Id.
171. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *49.
172. Id.
173. The phrase "compulsory deference" was used by Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595 (1979), a case involving a church property dispute. While the specifics of the case are
quite different from the Title VII issue presented in Petruska I, the Third Circuit found Jones's
underlying reasoning to be applicable. Specifically, in Jones, the Court reinforced the principle
"that religious organizations are bound by secular laws, so long as those laws do not require
inquiry into religious doctrine." Id. at *36. Thus, because Petruska's claims did not require the
inquiry discussed in Jones, the Third Circuit correctly decided to hear her case.
174. Id. at *37.
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tion, the majority "effectively refuses to recognize any ministerial
exception, placing [it] at odds with every other federal court of ap-
peals to consider the issue."'1 75 In Judge Smith's view, a church's right
to select and terminate ministers is absolute. 176 He found that placing
any limitations on this right egregiously violates a religious institu-
tion's First Amendment protections. 177
Addressing the Free Exercise Clause first, Judge Smith found that
the court should focus on the plaintiff's functions as an employee, re-
gardless of whether Gannon University asserted a religious justifica-
tion for its treatment of Petruska.' 78 Petruska qualifies as a
"minister."'1 79 Once that had been established, Title VII, "a neutral
law of general applicability," did not apply-where a religious institu-
tion is concerned, it will only apply to "lay employment decisions."'180
Turning to the Establishment Clause issues raised by the major-
ity,' 8 ' Smith reached a similar conclusion: "Because, as discussed
above, a church's choice regarding who will perform its spiritual func-
tions is inherently a religious decision, any inquiry into that decision
175. Id. at *57-58 (Smith, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at *58 ("I disagree with the majority's fundamental premise that a church's choice
regarding who performs particular spiritual functions is not necessarily a religious decision....
[S]uch a decision is, by its very nature, a religious one.").
177. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *58 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnment
interference with [a church's ministerial employment decisions] necessarily infringes on [its] free
exercise of religion and entangles the courts in religious matters.").
178. Id. at *65-66. "[M]atters of governance and internal organization" are still at issue even
though "Gannon has not identified an internal regulation or religious doctrine that required it
... to hire Father Rouch to fill [the] position" above Petruska at the behest of Bishop Trautman.
Id. at *65.
179. Id. at *66. Some of Petruska's duties as chaplain were spiritual in nature: "she served as
co-chair for the Catholic Identity Task Force, held prayer services, and was traditionally involved
in planning liturgies." Id. at *66 n.50.
180. Id. at *67-68 (emphasis in original). However, it has been argued that the court's deter-
mination regarding a plaintiff's ministerial status requires them to directly decide "questions of
religious doctrine in a way they never do when deciding whether discrimination occurred."
Corbin, supra note 17, at 2026. According to Corbin, courts entangle themselves in religious
doctrine by taking "a functional approach to determining who counts as a minister" and could
actually characterize all of a religious entity's employees as ministers. Id. at 2026-27 ("In order
to decide whether [a] position is ministerial, the court must determine whether a plaintiff's job 'is
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."' (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Con-
ference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)): accord Dunlap, supra
note 16, at 2032 ("[G]ranting the judiciary the authority to define who performs 'enough' spiri-
tual functions to qualify as a minister gives the government much the same power as it would
possess if the ministerial exemption did not exist.").
181. Judge Smith did not necessarily find it important to address the Establishment Clause,
because, in his view, "the Free Exercise Clause bars any claim which limits a church's right to
choose who will fulfill particular spiritual functions" and made consideration of the Establish-
ment Clause unnecessary in this case. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *69 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). Nonetheless, he decided to respond "to the majority's treatment of that issue." Id.
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would traverse such questions" and, consequently, is beyond a secular
court's jurisdiction.18 2 In fact, Judge Smith found that, "[e]ven though
the decision here involves an individual act rather than general prac-
tice, the necessary inquiry-asking whether the church can justify its
employment decision with reference to church doctrine-excessively
entangles the court."1 83
D. Petruska's Outcome
After authoring the Third Circuit's breakthrough Title VII opinion,
Judge Becker passed away. 18 4 Shortly after his death, Gannon Uni-
versity petitioned the court for a rehearing by a reconstituted panel,
and its request was granted. 185 It is unnecessary to dedicate much
time to Petruska II, because the Third Circuit vacated its prior deci-
sion straight away.'8 6 Judge Smith applied the same line of reasoning
used in his Petruska dissent to author Petruska H,187 and, just like that,
Lynette Petruska was back where she started: in a federal district
court that applied the ministerial exception in a way that precluded
her sex discrimination claim from being heard.
IV. ANALYSIS
The original Petruska decision was well reasoned and correctly de-
cided.1 88 While moving in an entirely new direction, it did not stray
182. Id. at *70.
183. Id. at *70-71. For a more detailed discussion of this assertion, see Part IV and accompa-
nying text. For now, it is enough to realize that Judge Smith's entanglement argument is illogi-
cal. How does simply asking Gannon University to assert religious doctrine in support of its
alleged discriminatory act excessively entangle the court? Was Petruska's performance at work
less than satisfactory? Did she violate a religious belief in her pursuit of nunhood? Or was she
performing her job well by advocating on behalf of the university students who had been vio-
lated by its President? All of these questions can be answered fairly easily, given that there are
many witnesses who could testify in front of the District Court. However, the only way this
testimony could come to light is if a court agreed to hear it-and this is a possibility completely
barred by Judge Smith's acceptance of the blanket ministerial exception.
184. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska 11), 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006). The opinion was
issued several days after Judge Becker's death in May 2006. See Henriques, supra note 121.
185. Petruska I, 462 F.3d at 294. Judge Nygaard, who served as the third judge on the panel
in the original decision (in addition to Judges Becker and Smith), recused himself from the re-
constituted panel. Id. The circuit randomly selected Judges Cowen and Greenberg to join Judge
Smith in hearing the case for the second time. Id.
186. Id. at 299.
187. See id. at 303-12.
188. Several commentaries on the ministerial exception have called for precisely the decision
the Third Circuit authored in Petruska. See, e.g., Coon, supra note 25, at 484-85 (arguing that
"instead of focusing on whether an employment dispute implicates a ministerial relationship ...
justiciability should be based on whether adjudication of the dispute would actually implicate
religious doctrine or practice"); Hodson, supra note 7, at 573 (arguing that "the obligations of a
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from the binding principles handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court
since Title VII's enactment in 1964.189 Moreover, the Third Circuit's
thorough analysis of how and why other circuits have applied the ex-
ception demonstrated its willingness to consider other circuits' ap-
proaches before determining that the exception is, in fact, being
wrongly applied. By dedicating a large portion of its decision to ex-
amining, and ultimately rejecting, each of the three commonly used
rationales for applying the ministerial exception, 190 the Third Circuit
strengthened its position and clearly reasoned why the exception, as
applied, is not in accordance with Congress's intentions when it en-
acted the section 702 exemption to Title VII. 191 Thus, even more im-
portant than correctly examining and applying existing precedent
regarding the exception, the Third Circuit interpreted section 702 ac-
cording to its plain language and, as a result, Petruska is the most ac-
curate and least judicially active decision, making it the one that
should be followed by district courts throughout the United States.t 92
The issues addressed in Petruska I and Petruska H are complex.
These decisions, as well as several of the cases discussed in this Note,
exhibit the inherent conflict between First Amendment liberties and
the protection that the Fourteenth Amendment provides for members
of a protected class.' 93 The threshold question becomes the following:
religious employer under Title VII should be based on whether the employment practice is relig-
iously based rather than on whether the employment practice discriminates on a nonreligious
basis or whether the activities of the employee in question are central to the religion's mission").
189. See supra notes 77-103 and accompanying text.
190. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska I), No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at
*37-50 (3d Cir. May 24, 2006), reh'g granted, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir. June 20,
2006); see also supra notes 109-149.
191. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *25.
192. See the Third Circuit's discussion of the language of the section 702 exemption:
[T]he exemption is restricted to the decision to employ "individuals of a particular re-
ligion" to perform work connected with the organization's activities. Thus, Congress
gave churches the explicit right to discriminate on the basis of religion, but declined to
create a right to discriminate on the basis of sex or to retaliate against an employee for
complaining of sex discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted). Interpreting a statute by looking at what Congress purposely left out of
the law is a form of classic statutory interpretation.
193. See supra notes 77-103 and accompanying text. See also Duane E. Okamoto, Religious
Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organizations: A Basic Values Analysis
for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1375-77 (1987) (framing
the "inherent conflict" in a very similar manner as portrayed in this Note: "On the one hand,
allowing a religious group to practice religious discrimination in employment matters advances
first amendment goals by allowing religious groups to keep their beliefs intact. On the other
hand, allowing a religious group to discriminate may seriously infringe upon the individual em-
ployee's right to be free from discrimination .... ); Rutherford, supra note 104, at 1059 (refer-
ring to the First Amendment as a "shield" used by religious institutions in order to "protect
themselves against claims of illegal discrimination"; Kristen Colletta & Darya Kapulina, Note,
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When does the burden on free exercise override another compelling
state interest, such as equal protection? 94 Second, how does the Es-
tablishment Clause fit into this picture?1 95 This Note argues that the
expansion of the ministerial exception warrants tipping the balance
between these two competing amendments in favor of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While selecting a minister, understood as a church
leader or other individual whose job involves religious doctrine,
should be protected by the First Amendment, the expanding defini-
tion of "minister" is overinclusive and allows religious institutions to
enjoy more protection than necessary at the expense of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 96 As many cases have demonstrated, 197 the min-
isterial exception has been applied to employment positions that are
more secular than religious in nature and, therefore, should not be
exempt from "generally applicable legal obligations."'1 98
As the Third Circuit noted, Gannon University never asserted a re-
ligious justification for the adverse employment action it took against
Petruska, which ultimately forced her out of her job1 99 Thus, in its
original decision, the court was able to avoid any serious conflict with
the First Amendment Religion Clauses and still seriously consider Pe-
Employment Discrimination and the First Amendment: Case Analysis of Catholic Charities, 23
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 189, 189 (2005).
194. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.
1985). This is not a new question. In one of the most famous cases dealing with the conflict
between First Amendment liberties and other legitimate, if not necessary, state laws, the Court
stated that "[t]he values underlying [the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses] have been
zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social
importance." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). The Court explained that "interests
of admittedly high social importance" must, in fact, be those of the "highest order." Id. at
214-15.
195. The Court has pointed out that, while this First Amendment Religion Clause is the "less
explicit" of the two clauses, it is still "an equally firm ... prohibition against the establishment of
any religion by government." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
196. As Corbin noted, "the ministerial exception leaves more than ordained clergy without a
remedy." Corbin, supra note 17, at 1976. In fact, religious organizations' "expanded role,
spurred by [President George W. Bush's] Faith-Based Initiatives and changes in religion clause
jurisprudence, multiplies the number of positions that are potentially subject to the ministerial
exemption." Id. at 1969.
197. See supra notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
198. Lupu, supra note 21, at 391. The Court's discussion in Yoder of the relationship between
state-mandated education and religion supports this contention: "A way of life, however virtu-
ous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of educa-
tion if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses,
the claims must be rooted in religious belief." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added). For more
information about Title VII's status as a "neutral law of general application," see Brant, supra
note 6, at 303-11.
199. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska 1), No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *39
(3d Cir. May 24, 2006), reh'g granted, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir. June 20, 2006).
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truska's sexual discrimination claim. 200 In contrast, the blanket ex-
emption employed by the reconstituted Third Circuit panel in
Petruska II runs contrary to well-established notions of liberty and
permits Gannon University, by virtue of its religious association, to
engage in gender discrimination for reasons unfounded in religious
doctrine. 20 1 Surely, it can be difficult to sort out what is and what is
not religious doctrine for purposes of the ministerial exception; how-
ever, any such complexity should not preclude courts from engaging in
such a searching analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that, in some cases, a fine line exists between a religious person or
entity's "way of life" and what actually constitutes "religious belief or
practice. '20 2 It is unfair to assume that every employment decision
made by a religious institution is somehow fundamental to that insti-
tution's religious doctrine. Instead, evaluating each Title VII discrimi-
nation claim on a case-by-case basis is, for several reasons, the better
approach. 20 3
First, facts are critical to deciding individual Title VII cases. 20 4
Rather than endorsing other circuits' policy of promptly dismissing Ti-
tle VII cases once a defendant religious institution asserts the ministe-
200. Id. at *37-50.
201. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 ("Although a determination of what is a 'religious' belief
or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on mat-
ters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.") This powerful statement
demonstrates the importance of maintaining a balance between First Amendment liberties and
other important societal rights. The ministerial exception, as applied in Petruska II, allows relig-
ious institutions to avoid dealing with the "delicate question" of what really constitutes religious
doctrine and, in fact, avoids asking any questions at all.
202. Id. at 215. The Court included a helpful illustration in its Yoder opinion. The Court
responded to the defendant Amish family's argument that their "religious faith and their mode
of life are ... inseparable and interdependent":
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected
the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would
not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather
than religious, and such a belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id. at 215-16.
203. Some commentators perceive the judiciary's refusal to hear these cases according to their
individual merits as granting too much preference to religious organizations. See, e.g., Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 24, at 34. "Courts routinely refuse to entertain claims of unlawful discrimina-
tion by clergy or other religious leaders against religious entities .... No other type of organiza-
tion gets the benefit of rules of deference and nonintervention that these decisions routinely
apply." Id. at 33-34.
204. See Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing how important it is
for an attorney to "gain the familiarity with the facts of the [Title VII] case that is so important in
the fact-intensive area of employment discrimination").
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rial exception,20 5  the Third Circuit correctly emphasized that
premature dismissal of a valid claim is just as dangerous as a potential
First Amendment infringement. 20 6 There are ways in which district
courts can avoid deciding religious questions while still allowing the
complainant to present her evidence. 20 7 Capable factfinders 20 8 can as-
sess the evidence without engaging in serious inquiries regarding the
religious doctrine of the institution involved in the lawsuit. 20 9 In
short, it is possible for a court to tailor its examination of a Title VII
claim in a way that prevents entanglement with religion but allows it
to remain fair to the plaintiff by seriously considering her allegations
of discrimination. 210
205. See, e.g., Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206
(N.D. I11. 1993), affd, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).
206. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska I), No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at
*42-43 (3d Cir. May 24, 2006), reh'g granted, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir. June 20,
2006). In this portion of its opinion, the court included an excerpt from a D.C. Circuit decision
that it found to be instructive. The following quote is taken from Minker v. Baltimore Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990), which dealt with a min-
ister's contract claim:
It could turn out that in attempting to prove his case, appellant will be forced to
inquire into matters of ecclesiastical policy .... Of course, in that situation, a court may
grant summary judgment on the ground that appellant has not proved his case and
pursuing the matter further would create an excessive entanglement with religion. On
the other hand, it may turn out that the potentially mischievous aspects of [appellant's]
claim are not contested by the Church or are subject to entirely neutral methods of
proof. The speculative nature of our discussion here demonstrates why it is premature
to foreclose appellant's ... claim. Once evidence is offered, the district court will be in
a position to control the case so as to protect against any impermissible entanglements.
Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *43-44 (quoting Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360).
207. For instance, in Petruska's case, the Third Circuit found that she "could cite evidence that
she was demoted due to discrimination without any religious basis. . . . [Sihe might present
evidence that the decisionmakers said that they had not religious reason to discriminate against
her." Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *42 (emphasis in original). To support her
position, Petruska could also raise the point that Gannon University hired her as chaplain know-
ing that she was a woman. If Gannon's religious doctrine bars women from serving in this posi-
tion, why appoint Petruska in the first place?
208. The original Third Circuit panel articulated its confidence in the "excellent district courts
in [its] circuit" and found that they were "up to the task" of examining "whether a piece of
evidence calls religious doctrine into question." Id. at *44.
209. For instance, the Third Circuit explained that, while a district court "may be constitution-
ally required to limit discovery or exclude evidence designed to call into question the validity,
existence, or plausibility of the religious doctrine," such measures can be taken in our country's
legal system. Id. at *43.
210. Such an approach "would risk foreclosing perfectly valid claims, thereby ignoring the will
of Congress without a justification rooted in the Constitution." Id. at *46. The Court also rein-
forced the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment: "We will not, until we have a constitu-
tional reason to do so, enfeeble 'a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial
injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the American
dream for so long."' Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204
(1979)).
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Second, the spectrum of ministerial positions is vast and varies de-
pending on the religious organization involved. Since the Rayburn de-
cision, courts have largely focused on the employment position
occupied by the plaintiff,211 further warranting a case-by-case analysis
of Title VII claims involving religious institutions. In Rayburn, the
Fourth Circuit used the balancing test the Court fashioned in Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder 212 to determine which was more important: free exercise
of religion or equal employment opportunities.213 After entertaining
this broad question, the Rayburn court found that the "balance
weigh[ed] in favor of free exercise of religion" and then inquired
about the ministerial status of the employment decision.214 Finding
that the employment position that the plaintiff had wished to occupy
was indeed that of a "minister," the Fourth Circuit promptly ended its
inquiry.21 5 This is the major point of contention between Rayburn and
Petruska.2 16 In emphasizing the importance of the First Amendment
concerns, courts like Rayburn effectively minimize the harm that the
subsequent Fourteenth Amendment violations cause protected in-
viduals. The Seventh Circuit is one of many courts that has adopted
the Rayburn court's view: "'While an unfettered church choice may
create minimal infidelity to the objectives of Title VII, it provides
maximum protection of the First Amendment right to free exercise of
religious beliefs.'"217 However, as demonstrated in Petruska, the min-
isterial exception creates much more than "minimal infidelity" to Title
211. See supra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
212. 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (balancing the burden on free exercise against the "impediment
to [the state's] objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed . . . exemption").
213. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1985) (dismissing plaintiff's sexual and racial discrimination claims under Title VII, because
"state scrutiny of the church's choice would infringe substantially on the church's free exercise of
religion and would constitute impermissible government entanglement with church authority");
see also Lupu, supra note 21, at 392 ("Cases such as Rayburn pit our social concern for equal
employment opportunity against our constitutional commitment to governmental respect for re-
ligious freedom of choice.").
214. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168. The plaintiff in Rayburn was challenging the church's deci-
sion not to hire her as an associate pastor. Id. at 1164-65. This role included several spiritual
duties, such as introducing children to the church, leading Bible study sessions, counseling a
singles group, preaching from the pulpit, and leading the congregation during church services.
Id. at 1168.
215. Having fulfilled its duty of determining whether "the position of associate in pastoral
care is important to the spiritual mission" of the defendant church, the court neglected to go
further and did not "inquire whether the reason for [plaintiff's] rejection had some explicit
grounding in theological belief." Id. at 1169.
216. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Petruska 1), No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *28
(3d Cir. May 24, 2006), reh'g granted, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir. June 20, 2006).
217. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169).
[Vol. 57:10931120
PETRUSKA V. GANNON UNIVERSITY
VII and, in some cases, actually results in invidious discrimination and
the dismissal of potentially valid claims.21 8 Thus, while the outcome in
Rayburn was arguably the correct one in that case, the bright-line rule
that the Fourth Circuit constructed has resulted in full immunity for
religious organizations and has turned "the Free Exercise Clause into
a license for the free exercise of discrimination unmoored from relig-
ious principle. '219
Meanwhile, other courts have been more reluctant to balance the
interests and, instead, have found that religious freedom overrides all
other constitutional concerns. According to some courts, the ministe-
rial exception is necessary, because "some religious interests are 'so
strong-that no compelling state interest justifies government intrusion
into the ecclesiastical sphere.'" 220 The Alicea-Hernandez and Miller
courts relied on this reasoning and, in doing so, characterized the spe-
cific positions of press secretary to the Hispanic community and choir
director-positions that have a very limited influence on the church's
central functions-as "so strong" that there can be absolutely no in-
quiry in cases where plaintiffs allege discrimination. It is evident that
this judicially created exception for "ministers" reaches too far.221
Applying the ministerial exception in such a broad manner grants re-
ligious employers "carte blanche to engage in discrimination, whether
it is gender, or marital status, or sexual orientation, so long as the
discriminatory decision can be explained at least tangentially by some
religious belief. 222
218. In Alicea-Hernandez, for example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the com-
munications manager's discrimination claims without considering the merits. Id. at 704. Rather,
the court held that the First Amendment precluded it from examining her discrimination claims.
Id.
219. Petruska 1, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *28. Instead, the Third Circuit opted to
consider the employer's reasons for making the employment decision, for "these reasons make
all the difference." Id. At this time, the Third Circuit made sure to note that its "version of the
ministerial exception also comports with the Establishment Clause because courts will not be
forced to consider religious questions, a process that could entangle the government in religious
affairs." Id. (emphasis omitted).
220. Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc.. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (E.D. Wis.
2001) (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999)).
221. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court "made it clear that
religious entities may ask for legislative exemptions narrowly tailored to their religious prac-
tices." Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1214-15 (arguing that, "[i]f a religious entity can persuade a legislature
that exempting it from the law will not harm the public good, then an exemption is consistent
with ordered democracy").
222. HAMILTON, supra note 84, at 192.
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V. IMPACT
Among all of the classes that Title VII protects, the ministerial ex-
ception has had the greatest impact on women. 223 This is not surpris-
ing considering the history of discrimination and exclusion women
have experienced in religious communities.224 Many of the early
prohibitions on women's religious involvement were grounded in the
fear that women would gain too much influence in these powerful in-
stitutions. 225 Gender stereotypes allowed men to reinforce religious
rules that called for women's subordination 226 and, consequently,
maintain their control among religious clergies and their followers.
Moreover, discrimination within religious institutions has a
profound effect upon society as a whole. 227 Allowing sexual discrimi-
nation in religious organizations permits these employers to take ad-
vantage of women's labor and simultaneously reinforces the notion
223. "In the past fifteen years, and with increasing frequency of late, religious institutions
have claimed constitutionally based rights to engage in otherwise prohibited forms of discrimina-
tion. Virtually all of the cases in the employment context have involved matters of gender dis-
crimination." Lupu, supra note 21, at 395-96; accord Corbin, supra note 17, at 1969 n.15 ("[S]ex
discrimination ... is both the harder and more common case.").
224. As early as colonial times, women faced persecution for preaching religion. Rutherford,
supra note 104, at 1052.
225. See id. at 1054. Jane Rutherford analogized this early treatment of women to the exclu-
sion of African Americans from important positions in churches and other religious bodies:
Just as a woman might be more attracted to a faith that believed that grace was con-
ferred on all genders, African-Americans might be more likely to read the Bible to
condemn rather than support slavery. Therefore, prohibitions against African-Ameri-
can preachers were meant both to circumvent certain religious views and to reinforce
the subordination of African-Americans.
Id.
226. See id. Unfortunately, many of the stereotypes that existed centuries ago continue to
permeate modern American society. Stereotypes that were used to exclude women from
preaching during colonial times are still common reasons why some men prefer to keep women
out of positions of leadership in corporate America. For example, it was thought that "women
were supposed to be emotional rather than rational, and therefore less able to preach." Id.
Rutherford pointed out that, while "we no longer whip African-American preachers nor exile
women who dare interpret scriptures, we do lend the power of the state to exclude women and
minorities from religious offices." Id. at 1055-56. Much of this exclusion is the result of overin-
clusive application of the judicially created ministerial exception.
227. Eikenberry, supra note 18, at 271; see Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination:
Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women's Equality, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
459, 459 (2004) (arguing that, "from the perspective of women's rights, relegating religion to the
private sphere does not effectively solve the inherent conflict between patriarchal religions and
women's rights or ensure women's right to equality in the liberal state"). "Excluding disfavored
groups from religions also circumscribes their role in the larger community." Rutherford, supra
note 104, at 1092 (emphasizing the "important communal role" religion plays by "provid[ing] a
community of shared values, concerns, and culture that, for many, serves as an anchor in a frag-
mented society").
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that women are somehow inferior to men.228 Limiting women's access
to leadership roles within their religious communities also "exclude[s]
them from an important avenue of political access," as religion plays a
huge role in shaping people's political opinions.229 The line between
the "private sphere" and the "public sphere" is blurred.230 Catego-
rizing religion as an issue falling squarely within the private sphere
ignores the great influence religious beliefs and organizations have on
the secular world.231
Ideally, religious organizations could resolve instances of sexual dis-
crimination internally, thus making government intervention unneces-
sary. However, Petruska II and other cases demonstrate that this is
unlikely.232 Petruska, a woman who actually occupied a powerful po-
sition, had all of her powers stripped from her for doing her job. It
was easy for the men at Gannon to exclude her from the decision-
making process; consider how much easier it would be for a secretary
or choir director's allegations of sexual discrimination to be ignored.
The law should not leave the task of dealing with Title VII discrimina-
228. For instance, "[w]hen a religious institution claims a constitutional right to pay women
lower wages for performing the same work as men, that institution is not only communicating its
religious beliefs; it is also sending a powerful social message about the value of women's labor."
Brant, supra note 6, at 277.
229. Eikenberry, supra note 18, at 271. Rutherford stated the following:
Religions are key political players. They have long been influential on the most im-
portant political concerns from abolition, to desegregation, to abortion. Religious orga-
nizations not only take stands on important issues, they also become involved in politics
directly. Clergy members have run for and held political office, and conservative Chris-
tian groups have taken control of several state Republican Party organizations. Conse-
quently, religious groups are sources of political power and influence.
Rutherford, supra note 104, at 1093.
230. See Brant, supra note 6, at 277 ("Because churches have long enjoyed a role of moral and
ethical leadership, the resistance of religious organizations to equal employment laws can under-
mine the effectiveness of those laws in the public sphere.").
231. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 17, at 1968-69 (emphasizing that "[t]he need to challenge the
constitutional underpinnings of the ministerial exception is more important than ever due to the
increasing role of religious entities in distributing social services"); Stopler, supra note 227, at
459.
232. For instance, consider an analogous situation: "It is painfully apparent that self-policing
has not worked to protect thousands of children from severe childhood sexual abuse.... Indeed,
but for the law, the abuse may have stayed out of the public's awareness forever." Hamilton,
supra note 221, at 1206-07. For total church autonomy to be feasible, Hamilton argued, "the
churches would have to take it upon themselves to ensure that their actions served the public
good, or at least did not harm it." Id. at 1208-09. However, in the child sexual abuse cases,
"[n]either the public good nor the best interest of children was an overriding concern of the
Church; rather, perpetuation of the institution, avoidance of public scandal, and preservation of
power were far more potent motivators." Id. at 1209.
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tion claims up to religious institutions.233 Rather, it is time for the
judicial system to engage in a more searching analysis and end its ab-
solute deference to all religious employers. 2
34
Some commentators have found that the legal system may not be
the correct route for dealing with employment discrimination against
women. 235 Pointing to the overall advancement of women in society,
these commentators have taken the optimistic stance "that employ-
ment practices and policies [of religious congregations] will come to
reflect, even model, those aspired to in society at large. ' 236 Again,
while this would be ideal, it is unlikely to happen in the near future.
This Note does not argue that the government should require the
Catholic Church to hire female priests, but rather that the Church be
prevented from discriminating against women in positions that they
are allowed to occupy under Church doctrine. Aside from the fact
that this form of discrimination has been ongoing for centuries, there
is no logical or religious justification for it.237 Requiring women to
wait for change from within not only prevents them from retaining
their jobs, but also excludes them from initiating any changes that may
lead to greater equality.
V. CONCLUSION
We must be mindful that, when courts choose to create their own
exceptions to an important and widely litigated statute such as Title
VII, they end up harming those that Title VII was intended to protect:
those who experience discrimination due to their "race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin. ' 238 When Congress drafted the section
702 exemption, it expressly stated that the only permissible discrimi-
nation in which religious employers could engage was based on relig-
233. Some have argued that discrimination against an employee in a religious organization
"may even be more harmful to the individual than discrimination in the secular world."
Eikenberry, supra note 18, at 271.
234. See Corbin, supra note 17, at 2022. Corbin aptly demonstrated that courts are well suited
to "ferret out discrimination" and can analyze religious employment decisions by utilizing the
same techniques they apply in secular cases. Id. Even where the defendant proffers a religious
justification for the adverse employment action, it is not outside the courts' jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the stated reason is pretextual: "Since an employee's claims may be resolved by
relying on neutral methods of proof, religious organizations should not be shielded from having
their reasons scrutinized just because they proffer a subjective religious reason." Id.
235. See, e.g., Elisabeth S. Wendorff, Employment Discrimination and Clergywomen: Where
the Law Has Feared to Tread, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 136 (1993).
236. Id. at 161.
237. As one commentator has stated, "[t]here is an absolute right to believe, but at the same
time there can be no constitutional right to harm others in the name of religion." Hamilton,
supra note 221, at 1109.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
[Vol. 57:10931124
PETRUSKA V. GANNON UNIVERSITY
ion. Adding First Amendment protections to this limited exception
should not result in the expansive and overinclusive ministerial excep-
tion that is currently utilized by all U.S. appellate courts that have
addressed the issue. Rather, it is imperative that courts and lawyers
across the nation are aware of the vacated Petruska v. Gannon Univer-
sity decision, for it contains exceptional arguments calling for the nar-
row application of the ministerial exception.
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